Steve Potash Testimony Analysis: What The Committee Should Have Asked

Steve Potash, CEO and founder of OverDrive, submitted testimony to the DC Council opposing legislation (B26-0490) that would require ebook publishers to offer library-compatible licensing terms. This analysis separates verifiable claims from unverifiable ones, identifies structural issues with the testimony, and documents the questions the committee should have asked but apparently did not.

What Checks Out: Verifiable Claims

Potash\'s historical claims about OverDrive\'s role in building digital lending align with independent sources. The timeline in Appendix E matches Library Technology Guides documentation:

• OCOU model launch: April 2003 ✓
• Kindle library lending: September 2011 ✓
• CPC (Checkout Period Check) implementation: December 2014 ✓

The 16 years of DCPL circulation data (2010-2025) appears sourced from OverDrive's own platform analytics. Potash explicitly disclaims the limitation: "solely from digital content from the OverDrive platforms and apps" and excludes third-party providers like Hoopla or Palace Project. This is honest methodology documentation.

The claim that DCPL's digital circulation grew 14% over 2024 is plausible against the national OverDrive average of 10.9% reported January 2026.

The pricing data in Appendix D reflects OverDrive Marketplace pricing as of January 2, 2026. No credible reason to doubt its accuracy, since fabricating pricing in government testimony carries enormous legal risk for no strategic benefit.

What Cannot Be Verified: Unsourced Claims

"Over 100 in-house public and school librarians"

Potash claims OverDrive employs "over 100 in-house public and school librarians." OverDrive's website lists an executive team but publishes no staff directory or credential breakdown. The committee has no way to verify this claim. This is important because:

• 100 credentialed librarians is a competitive moat no other vendor can match
• All 100 have economic dependence on OverDrive's business model surviving
• Their professional advocacy in ALA committees, conferences, and informal networks is shaped by employment regardless of intent

"Privately, public librarians have shared similar concerns with me"

Potash claims unnamed librarians privately agree with his opposition to the bill. This is presented as evidence that the bill is unpopular with the profession. The problem: no names, no attribution, no way to verify. He then uses these unnamed sources to argue that bill supporters "may just be participating to shine a spotlight on the issue" rather than genuinely wanting its passage. That's a substantial claim to make without attribution.

"They didn\'t ask for their help, and they don\'t need their help"

Potash attributes to multiple unnamed "public library leaders" the sentiment that they didn\'t request and don\'t need help from Library Futures. Again: unattributed hearsay presented as evidence. This is Potash speaking for librarians without letting them speak for themselves.

Over 50% of DCPL's 95,000 unique titles on perpetual licenses with "no time limits, no limits on number of circ"

This is a significant operational claim. If true, it means half of DCPL\'s OverDrive collection is on OCOU perpetual model. But the testimony does not provide the critical data: What percentage of DCPL\'s annual digital content SPENDING goes to each licensing model?

A title can be perpetual and still represent a tiny fraction of the budget. If DCPL spends 5% on OCOU and 95% on metered/subscription/CPC models, the rhetoric about "50% perpetual" is misleading. The committee evaluated a pricing bill without knowing how the budget is actually allocated.

Structural Issues: How The Testimony Is Framed

Issue 1: Legal Disclaimer vs. Legal Structure

Potash opens by saying he testifies "solely based on my role as chief executive officer" and "this is not being offered in any legal capacity." Yet the entire document is structured as a legal brief: table of contents, numbered sections, footnotes, appendices, exhibits. He identifies himself as admitted to practice before the Supreme Court and invokes his JD credentials on page 1.

The framing says "not legal" while the structure says "legal." A committee member would reasonably treat this with legal weight despite the disclaimer.

Issue 2: A Vendor Testifying About Its Own Market

OverDrive controls approximately 90%+ of the public library ebook market. The legislation directly affects OverDrive\'s revenue model. Potash was invited by DCPL\'s Library Director, his own customer. Yet nowhere in 55 pages does he disclose:

• OverDrive's ownership by KKR (a $638 billion private equity firm)
• That KKR's fund is in harvest mode (meaning OverDrive could be sold)
• OverDrive's margin structure on different licensing models
• Whether OverDrive has taken on debt or paid dividends since the 2020 acquisition

He describes OverDrive as a "mission-based company" and "Certified B Corp." A committee member reading this testimony would not know it\'s owned by private equity. That\'s not a lie. But it\'s a material omission in a document designed to influence legislation affecting the vendor\'s business.

Issue 3: Conflating Vendor Interests with Librarian Interests

Potash positions OverDrive as aligned with librarians against CDL advocates. The truth is more complicated: OverDrive and some librarians may oppose CDL for completely different reasons. OverDrive profits from the current model. Librarians pay under it. That\'s not alignment; that\'s a shared interest in one outcome, based on opposite incentives.

Issue 4: The "Book Banning" Framing

Potash renames the bill the "DC Book Banning bill" and argues that requiring CDL-compatible licensing terms is functionally equivalent to banning books. Publishers would pull content rather than comply, he predicts. He then draws a parallel to actual book banning legislation targeting LGBTQ+ and diversity content:

"Both are false and misleading as to their true intent."

This is rhetorical strategy, not analysis. The bill doesn't ban books. It sets licensing conditions. Whether publishers would withdraw content in response is a prediction, not a fact. And equating consumer protection legislation with ideological book banning trivializes the latter. The committee should evaluate whether this framing is persuasive or manipulative.

Issue 5: Personal Attacks on the Opposition

Potash names Kyle Courtney and Library Futures directly and characterizes their advocacy as:

• "Ill-advised"
• "A ruse to circumvent copyright law"
• Based on "a faulty set of assumptions"

He claims Courtney's hearing testimony was inaccurate and the committee "was not provided with accurate, reliable data." He states the bill is "doomed already."

Reasonable people can disagree about CDL. But a vendor using a government testimony platform to personally discredit advocacy organizations is a display of asymmetric power. OverDrive is a PE-backed monopoly vendor with revenues in the tens of millions. Library Futures is a nonprofit. The weight of the criticism should be evaluated accordingly.

What The Testimony Reveals About OverDrive's Business

1. Pricing Model Complexity = Lock-In Mechanism

Appendix E lists 25 distinct product variations since 2003. This is not innovation. It's SKU proliferation. Each model creates a different purchasing decision tree:

• OCOU (One Copy One User)
• SU (Subscription Use)
• MA12 / MA24 (Metered Access 12/24 checkouts)
• CPC (Checkout Period Check)
• Advantage Plus
• STSU (Short Term Subscription Use)
• OD Max
• All Access Comics
• All Access Kids
• All Access Cornerstone
• All Access Romance
• All Access Mystery

A librarian managing an OverDrive collection must understand all of these to optimize budget. That complexity is a switching cost. The more models you learn, the harder it is to evaluate simpler competitors.

2. Library Circulation Data Is A Strategic Asset

Potash presents 16 years of DCPL circulation data to the committee. He has this data because OverDrive\'s platform captures it. He references OverDrive investing "tens of millions of dollars annually" in the platform. Combined with the Eric Miller hire (Director of Data and Information Science) and Clarivate analytics integration, it\'s clear that OverDrive's data holdings (billions of monthly transactions) are being positioned as a core business asset, not just an operational byproduct.

3. The Revolving Door: DCPL Alumni at OverDrive

Potash casually mentions that DCPL's former Head of Collections joined OverDrive after retirement. He presents this as collaborative. What it actually is: a vendor hiring the person who used to make purchasing decisions for one of its customers. This is documented evidence of the vendor-library revolving door in action.

4. The "100 Librarians" Workforce Is A Competitive Moat

If OverDrive really employs 100 credentialed librarians, no competitor can match it. Palace Project, Hoopla, and other alternatives don\'t have that scale. It\'s a workforce advantage. But it\'s also 100 librarians economically dependent on OverDrive\'s business model surviving.

Questions The Committee Should Have Asked

About OverDrive's Ownership Structure

• What is OverDrive's ownership structure, and how does KKR ownership affect pricing decisions?
• Is KKR's fund in harvest mode? On what timeline might OverDrive be sold?
• Has OverDrive taken on debt since the 2020 KKR acquisition?
• Has OverDrive paid dividends to KKR? If so, how much?
• Why was KKR ownership not disclosed in testimony designed to influence library policy?

About OverDrive's Financial Model

• What is OverDrive's gross margin on each licensing tier (OCOU, CPC, All Access, etc.)?
• What percentage of DCPL's annual digital content SPENDING (not title count) goes to each model?
• How much of OverDrive's revenue comes from libraries vs. from publishers vs. from other sources?
• Has OverDrive raised prices on any licensing tier in the past 3 years? By how much?

About The "100 Librarians" Claim

• How many of the "100 in-house librarians" hold active MLS/MLIS degrees?
• What percentage of OverDrive's staff are librarians vs. engineers, sales, operations?
• Do any of these librarians sit on ALA committees or working groups that influence library policy?

About OverDrive's Data Practices

• What data does OverDrive collect about patron reading behavior?
• Who has access to this data internally? Externally?
• Is this data being packaged or sold as a business asset?
• What contractual limits exist on how OverDrive can use patron data?
• Eric Miller was hired as Director of Data and Information Science. What is his mandate?

About The Relationship Between DCPL and OverDrive

• Is DCPL under exclusive contract with OverDrive, or can they purchase from competitors?
• What are DCPL's contract terms with OverDrive? (Budget, renewal schedule, price escalation clauses)
• Why did DCPL's Director invite OverDrive to testify against legislation designed to help DCPL?
• Has DCPL conducted a competitive bid for digital ebook services in the past 5 years?

Questions ALA Should Be Asking Itself

• Why is a former ALA President serving on OverDrive's board while ALA advocates for alternative licensing models?
• Does ALA have a conflict-of-interest policy for leadership relationships with major vendors?
• Why did ALA\'s testimony to the DC committee consist of 2 pages while OverDrive\'s CEO submitted 55 pages?
• Does ALA have independent data on library ebook spending, pricing trends, and vendor market concentration?
• What is ALA's position on vendor data practices and patron privacy in digital lending?

Questions About The Bill Itself

• Does this bill actually address the intermediary problem? (It targets publisher pricing, not OverDrive's cut)
• What's the enforcement mechanism if publishers simply refuse to license under CDL terms?
• What are the penalties for non-compliance?
• Does the bill affect content already purchased under current licensing terms?
• Would the bill create a two-tier collection if some titles transition to CDL while others remain under current terms?

The Question We Should All Be Asking

We've been debating whether OverDrive will be sold. The real question is more fundamental:

Is the library community prepared for what happens when a company that controls 90%+ of digital lending infrastructure undergoes any ownership transition (sale, merger, IPO, or even a change in private equity fund strategy)?

The testimony makes clear the answer is no. Nobody at that hearing asked about:

• OverDrive's ownership structure
• Financial incentives
• Data practices
• Contingency plans

Everyone debated the bill. Nobody debated the monopoly.

Using This Framework

Source Document: B26-0490 Testimony PDF - Steve Potash, OverDrive CEO (January 6, 2026)

Related Analysis

• Steve Potash Testimony: The Details That Matter: The close-read findings: the bookstore pipeline, wait time trends, and what Potash didn't address
• Your Library Data Is Already Being Sold: How OverDrive monetizes circulation data and why libraries should publish their own